Cell Phone Sensors Detect Radiation to Thwart Nuclear Terrorism

Researchers at Purdue University are working with the state of Indiana to develop a system that would use a network of cell phones to detect and track radiation to help prevent terrorist attacks with radiological "dirty bombs" and nuclear weapons.

Such a system could blanket the nation with millions of cell phones equipped with radiation sensors able to detect even light residues of radioactive material. Because cell phones already contain global positioning locators, the network of phones would serve as a tracking system, said physics professor Ephraim Fischbach. Fischbach is working with Jere Jenkins, director of Purdue's radiation laboratories within the School of Nuclear Engineering.

"It's the ubiquitous nature of cell phones and other portable electronic devices that give this system its power," Fischbach says. "It's meant to be small, cheap and eventually built into laptops, personal digital assistants and cell phones."

The system was developed by Andrew Longman, a consulting instrumentation scientist. Longman developed the software for the system and then worked with Purdue researchers to integrate the software with radiation detectors and cell phones. Cellular data air time was provided by AT&T.

The research has been funded by the Indiana Department of Transportation through the Joint Transportation Research Program and School of Civil Engineering at Purdue.

"The likely targets of a potential terrorist attack would be big cities with concentrated populations, and a system like this would make it very difficult for someone to go undetected with a radiological dirty bomb in such an area," says Longman, who also is Purdue alumnus. "The more people are walking around with cell phones and PDAs, the easier it would be to detect and catch the perpetrator. We are asking the public to push for this."

Tiny solid-state radiation sensors are commercially available. The detection system would require additional circuitry and would not add significant bulk to portable electronic products, Fischbach says.

The technology is unlike any other system, particularly because the software can work with a variety of sensor types, he says.

"Cell phones today also function as Internet computers that can report their locations and data to their towers in real time," Fischbach says. "So this system would use the same process to send an extra signal to a home station. The software can uncover information from this data and evaluate the levels of radiation."

The researchers tested the system in November, demonstrating that it is capable of detecting a weak radiation source 15 feet from the sensors.

"We set up a test source on campus, and people randomly walked around carrying these detectors," Jenkins says. "The test was extremely safe because we used a very weak, sealed radiation source, and we went through all of the necessary approval processes required for radiological safety. This was a source much weaker than you would see with a radiological dirty bomb."

Officials from the Indiana Department of Transportation participated in the test.

"The threat from a radiological dirty bomb is significant, especially in metropolitan areas that have dense populations," says Barry Partridge, director of INDOT's Division of Research and Development.

Long before the sensors would detect significant radiation, the system would send data to a receiving center.

"The sensors don't really perform the detection task individually," Fischbach says. "The collective action of the sensors, combined with the software analysis, detects the source. The system would transmit signals to a data center, and the data center would transmit information to authorities without alerting the person carrying the phone. Say a car is transporting radioactive material for a bomb, and that car is driving down Meridian Street in Indianapolis or Fifth Avenue in New York. As the car passes people, their cell phones individually would send signals to a command center, allowing authorities to track the source."

The signal grows weaker with increasing distance from the source, and the software is able to use the data from many cell phones to pinpoint the location of the radiation source.

"So the system would know that you were getting closer or farther from something hot," Jenkins said. "If I had handled radioactive material and you were sitting near me at a restaurant, this system would be sensitive enough to detect the residue. "

The Purdue Research Foundation owns patents associated with the technology licensed through the Office of Technology Commercialization.

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Report Shows Little Evidence Of Coherent Al Qaeda Strategy For U.S. Attack

There is little consistent evidence that al Qaeda has a specific strategic plan for attacking targets within the United States, according to a recent RAND Corporation report.

Although al Qaeda succeeded in attacking the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, subsequent terrorist strikes have been outside the United States and were carried out by groups affiliated with – but not necessarily directed by – al Qaeda's core leadership, RAND researchers found.

Even if al Qaeda still had the capability to attack within the United States, the terrorist organization has given few clues about the types of venues it would seek to target and why, the RAND study finds.

“It is entirely possible that the many anti-American pronouncements al Qaeda's leaders have made since 9/11 are merely expressions of their hatred toward the United States and that any future attacks might reflect little more than that hatred,” said lead study author Martin Libicki. “Such attacks could actually have little to do with achieving anything for al Qaeda.”

The RAND report examined four hypotheses that might explain al Qaeda's targeting preferences in the United States:

• The coercion hypothesis states that al Qaeda would use terrorist attacks to cause pain in an attempt to coerce the United States into leaving the Islamic world.
• The damage hypothesis contends that al Qaeda seeks to reduce the ability of the United States to interfere in the Islamic world, largely through assaults designed to cause severe economic disruption.
• The rally hypothesis presumes that al Qaeda would use terrorist attacks within the United States to mobilize supporters and polarize relationships between the United States and the Islamic world.
• The franchise hypothesis posits that although al Qaeda retains its influence and reputation, it lacks the resources necessary to carry out attacks and therefore would use affiliated groups to do so.
  

Researchers for RAND, a nonprofit research organization, found that al Qaeda may well find that its most attractive targets within the United States are those that can simultaneously create fear and damage the U.S. economy – reflecting both the coercion and damage hypotheses.

The RAND report also examined a range of potential attacks that would be consistent with the coercion and damage hypotheses. Researchers concluded that two types of attacks would make powerful contributions to such strategic goals: either targeting America's food chain or industry, or using “dirty bombs” involving radiological dispersal devices.

“Either of these kinds of attacks would have the potential to cause severe social dislocation and economic damage,” says the study co-author Peter Chalk. “If they came on the heels of a widespread or suicide bombing campaign they could also possibly overwhelm the country's emergency management infrastructure.”

In order to determine which of the four potential strike hypotheses al Qaeda was most likely to use, researchers analyzed major attacks by the terrorist organization and its affiliates over the last decade. They also examined statements made by the group, and consulted with al Qaeda experts along the way.

Ultimately, the report finds that most attacks had more than one goal. For example, the Sept. 11 attacks caused significant human and economic casualties while also serving to rally al Qaeda supporters.

Researchers also concluded that al Qaeda is most likely to pick a future target in the United States that would meet similar strategic goals. However, if the next attacks are carried out by local jihadists with little or no direct input from al Qaeda, the assaults will most likely reflect the “franchise” group's beliefs.

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