Researchers Develop Pandemic Flu Prediction System
The 2003 epidemic of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in the Netherlands is the only recent epidemic of HPAI in the developed world. Gert-Jan Boender and colleagues have examined the data from this outbreak and produced a model which can predict the probability of infection from one farm to another; the "transmission kernel." They also identify high-risk areas in the Netherlands and analyze various control strategies, concluding that in these regions an epidemic can only be brought to an end by massive culling of susceptible farms.
For avian influenza, the analyses show that there are two poultry-dense areas in The Netherlands where epidemic spread is possible, one in the central region and one in the south, close to the German and Belgian border. The authors suggest local control measures are unlikely to be able to halt an unfolding epidemic in these areas.
The paper, published in the journal PLoS Computational Biology, arrives at these conclusions through a computational (or mathematical) modeling method, an approach which has already proved its worth in the analysis of infectious diseases such as the 2001 foot-and-mouth outbreak in the UK. The method can estimate the key parameters which determine the spread of highly transmissible animal diseases between farms. These risk maps identify geographic areas in which a given intervention strategy fails to control the spread of the disease between farms. "The risk map concept is an instrument suitable for analyses of epidemic control options both during crisis and in peacetime" says Boender.
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For avian influenza, the analyses show that there are two poultry-dense areas in The Netherlands where epidemic spread is possible, one in the central region and one in the south, close to the German and Belgian border. The authors suggest local control measures are unlikely to be able to halt an unfolding epidemic in these areas.
The paper, published in the journal PLoS Computational Biology, arrives at these conclusions through a computational (or mathematical) modeling method, an approach which has already proved its worth in the analysis of infectious diseases such as the 2001 foot-and-mouth outbreak in the UK. The method can estimate the key parameters which determine the spread of highly transmissible animal diseases between farms. These risk maps identify geographic areas in which a given intervention strategy fails to control the spread of the disease between farms. "The risk map concept is an instrument suitable for analyses of epidemic control options both during crisis and in peacetime" says Boender.
Bookmark http://universeeverything.blogspot.com/ and drop back in sometime.
Labels: avian flu, farms, flu, HPAI, Netherlands, pandemic, poultry
posted by Scott Nance at
4/19/2007 08:30:00 PM
1 Comments:
While the medical response to pandemic flu will be important to controlling its spread and limiting its toll, there are considerable non-medical issues related to flu preparedness that are essential for ensuring the continued well-being of the nation's economy. Planning for Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Continuity of Government (COG) is critical to maintaining the overall viability of society. Thus, while we rightly prepare for the flu, we must be equally prepared to function during the flu.
The Center for Technology and National Security Policy of the DOD's National Defense University has prepared a number of freely-available items which can help civilians be prepared both before and during the flu. "Bird Flu and You" is a poster available in 9 languages with basic information about influenza preparedness. "Weathering the Storm" is a report with information about planning for COOP, including instructions for carrying out "tabletop excercises" with a COOP plan.
Electronic copies of the poster are available at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Bird_flu.htm. Electronic copies of the report are available at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def_Tech/DTP%2038%20Weathering%20The%20Storm.pdf, and to request hard copies of the
report, contact the Life Sciences group at lifesciences@ndu.edu.
Robert E. Armstrong, Ph.D.
&
Mark D. Drapeau, Ph.D.
Center for Technology and National Security Policy
National Defense University
Washington, DC
This is the view of the authors and does not represent the official view of National Defense University, the U.S. Dept. of Defense, or the U.S government.
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